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Introduction 
The Department of Energy (DOE) Human Reliability Program (HRP), published as 10 CFR Part 
712, is currently being reviewed and revised to address concerns identified during its 
implementation.  Although these “page changes” primarily incorporate clarification of terms and 
language, the following discussion relates to broadening the definition of positions that require HRP 
certification that is found in §712.10.   
Because the program has matured, an evaluation of additional positions to be included in the HRP is 
germane.  Since the current HRP is used throughout the DOE complex to mitigate the insider risk 
from active to passive, other positions that have the potential to significantly impact our national 
security must be considered for inclusion into the program. 
Both physical security and the motivation and commitment of employees are required to protect 
DOE’s critical information and material assets.  As promulgated, the HRP focuses on individuals in 
positions that afford access to Category I special nuclear material (SNM) and relevant safeguards and 
transportation information.  Those positions are well covered by the program as it currently stands.  
However, many other positions occupied by individuals who create or control the flow of sensitive 
information or protect other assets are not included in the HRP.  Examples include executive 
protection services agents, who contribute to the safety and security of the Secretary of Energy, 
foreign dignitaries, and heads of state; systems administrators having access to classified information 
systems; and individuals who have access to chemical and biological agents or the detection systems 
for those agents. 
Since safety and security are heavily dependent on the willingness of each individual to comply with 
rules, regulations, and procedures, the HRP certification and recertification requirements seek to 
identify conditions or circumstances that could result in noncompliance.  A careful analysis of the 
physical and mental characteristics of the individual, past behavior, and information obtained during 
the certification or recertification process are all critical elements of detecting these factors.  The 
areas considered to be significant indicators of potential risk are: 
Alcohol and substance abuse:  Problems with self control and the ability to conform to 
legal, social, and domestic norms may be indicated by alcohol and/or substance abuse. 
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Financial responsibility:  How individuals manage money can reveal much about their self 
control and vulnerability to coercion and blackmail. 
Honesty:  Individuals who are honest in their daily lives are more likely to comply with 
organizational demands and perform in a safe, reliable, and trustworthy manner. 
Arrests and convictions:  Failure to comply with societal demands, which leads to 
problems with the law, could reflect broader problems with conformance. 
Social conformance:  The ability and willingness to conform to rules, regulations, and 
procedures is crucial to safety and security in DOE facilities.  Like arrests and convictions, 
other forms of social nonconformance greatly increase the risk that individuals may 
compromise the safety and security of the organization.  
Vulnerability:  Susceptibility to coercion can result from a variety of financial or personal 
conditions. 
Psychological stability:  Safety and security compliance demands that an individual be in 
control of thoughts, motives, and impulses.  Mental stability may affect control and 
ultimately the ability of the individual to conform. 
An individual who works in a position requiring HRP certification is evaluated on an ongoing basis, 
increasing the probability that conditions and circumstances indicating a concern will be detected.  
HRP-certified individuals may hesitate to jeopardize their positions by revealing such things as 
arrests, illnesses, or changes in domestic status or mental condition.  Yet, in a one-on-one  
interview with a psychologist or other medical professional and a DOE personnel security review 
may reveal information that could indicate a change in risk status.  It should also be noted that HRP 
certification, which serves as a constant reminder of unacceptable behaviors and conditions that 
could result in a loss of access or certification, could thereby have a deterrent effect. 
Continuous observation 
The HRP is a preemptive program, designed to detect concerns before safety and security are 
compromised.  The HRP process of continuous observation is designed to identify individuals who 
represent a potential reliability risk and ensure that DOE’s most sensitive materials and information 
are protected. 
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The HRP formal evaluation process offers a comprehensive means of identifying behaviors and 
conditions that may indicate safety and security risks.  The basic elements of continuous evaluation 
are performed for certification and then at least once every 12 months thereafter for recertification, 
but observation is conducted on an ongoing basis.  Elements of observation include: 
Supervisory review:  An HRP-certified individual’s supervisor has daily contact with the 
individual and is in a position to observe changes in behavior.  HRP supervisors are trained 
in observation skills, and are in a position to make reports and referrals before unusual 
behavior becomes a safety or security reliability issue.  Each year for HRP recertification, the 
supervisor formally evaluates each HRP-certified individual and makes a recommendation 
regarding certification. 
Medical assessment:  Facility occupational health professionals perform a comprehensive 
evaluation of each HRP-certified individual at 12-month intervals.  An assessment may also 
be performed for self-referrals and management concerns.  The occupational health office 
also tracks medication use and evaluates both prescription and over-the-counter medications 
against the job task analysis to determine the reliability risks of each individual’s medication 
use.  HRP-certified individuals are required to report to the occupational health office for a 
return-to-work evaluation after a five-day period of absence.  Medical monitoring of 
rehabilitative programs is also provided. 
Random drug and alcohol testing:  HRP candidates must successfully complete drug and 
alcohol tests before they receive certification.  HRP-certified individuals are then subject to 
drug and alcohol tests on a random basis.  Random tests must be performed at least once in 
every 12-month period.  These tests serve both passively, as a deterrent, and actively, as a 
means to identify drug and alcohol use among HRP-certified individuals. 
Management review:  Every 12 months for HRP recertification, the manager performs a 
careful evaluation of the results of the supervisor review, medical assessment, and random 
drug and alcohol testing, and provides a recommendation that the individual either be 
recertified or removed from the HRP.  This review provides objective oversight of the 
continuous observation process. 
DOE personnel security review:  DOE personnel security specialists perform a review of 
each HRP candidate and HRP-certified individual’s personnel security file and evaluate the 
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information found on Part 2 of the Questionnaire for National Security Positions.  Because 
this information can indicate potential or ongoing problems with reliability, an annual review 
is invaluable in detecting security concerns. 
Instruction:  Initial instruction is provided to all HRP candidates, followed by annual 
refresher instruction for recertification.  This instruction is comprehensive and covers all 
elements of the HRP.  Educational information is also available on other aspects of the HRP 
such as the observation and reporting of unusual behavior, reporting medication use, and 
identifying safety and security concerns. 
Individual awareness:  HRP-certified individuals have a role in the continuous observation 
process and are required to report reliability concerns in both themselves and others. 
This regular and formal process of continuous observation is vital to the success of the HRP in early 
identification of safety and security concerns.  All elements of continuous observation are integrated 
into a comprehensive program.  Therefore, extending HRP certification to other critical positions 
enhances national security and the safety of employees and the public by ensuring that individuals in 
these positions meet the highest standards of reliability and physical and mental suitability. 
Current HRP positions 
Section 712.10 of the HRP rule currently defines a position requiring HRP certification as one that: 
(1) Affords access to Category I SNM or has responsibility for transportation or 
protection of Category I quantities of SNM; 
(2) Involves nuclear explosive duties or has responsibility for working with, 
protecting, or transporting nuclear explosives, nuclear devices, or selected 
components; 
(3) Affords access to information concerning vulnerabilities in protective systems 
when transporting nuclear explosives, nuclear devices, selected components, or 
Category I quantities of SNM; or 
(4) Is not included in paragraphs (a)(1) through (3) of this section but affords the 
potential to significantly impact national security or cause unacceptable damage and 
is approved pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section. 
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These categories of positions are taken from the former PSAP [10 CFR Part 710 (Subpart B)] and 
PAP (10 CFR Part 711) rules, which were combined to form the basis for the HRP.  The PSAP and 
PAP were supplanted by the HRP rule when it was published on January 23, 2004 as 10 CFR Part 
712. 
The HRP allows additional positions to be nominated after an assessment process that includes an 
evaluation of the risks the position poses for the operational program.  If the analysis shows that 
more restrictive physical, administrative, or other controls could be implemented that would prevent 
the position from being designated an HRP position, those controls will be implemented, if 
practicable.  Any nominations must be approved by the NNSA Administrator or designee, the Chief 
Health, Safety and Security Officer or designee, or the appropriate Lead Program Secretarial Officer 
or designee. 
The positions described below do not currently require HRP certification but have the potential to 
significantly impact the DOE mission and national security.  DOE’s overall security posture would 
be strengthened by including these positions with those currently designated in the HRP. 
Proposed HRP positions 
Although a provision exists in the HRP to designate positions other than those specified in 
§712.10(a), in practice this provision has not been widely employed.  Certain positions, which should 
require HRP certification because of the risk to safety and security, are not included in the HRP rule.  
Failure to incorporate these positions poses a risk to the safety and security of DOE facilities and 
our national security.  It is therefore proposed that certain new categories of positions be added to 
those currently listed in §712.10(a).  A brief justification accompanies each category. 
Weapons designers 
Positions within the DOE weapons program, specifically weapons designers with access to weapons 
data categories Sigma 0 through 15, do not currently require HRP certification.  These tasks, 
however, entail specialized knowledge of weapons design and operations data that requires the 
highest level of reliability.  Such individuals have knowledge not only of current weapons designs but 
also entire weapons systems.  That information could be invaluable to someone wishing to harm the 
United States or its interests.   The security of that knowledge and information is subject to the 
reliability and trustworthiness of the designers.   
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Reviewing a weapons designer’s alcohol and drug use, social conformance, financial status, and 
psychological stability may reveal the risk potential of that individual.  Drug and alcohol abuse can 
interfere with the ability to control impulses and behavior and result in a failure to comply with the 
rules and regulations regarding the protection of classified information.   An even greater risk lies in 
the stress-money connection.  Domestic conditions can often lead to financial problems, also 
producing a significant amount of stress.  Such pressure can increase the likelihood that an 
individual might sell valuable information, believing that the money will reduce the stress and solve 
the problem.  HRP certification makes it more likely that an occupational health professional will be 
in a position to explore those issues and determine whether a risk is present.   When identified, such 
information is provided to DOE security elements for evaluation of the risk factors. 
HRP certification and recertification evaluations not only provide an opportunity to discover those 
who may pose a safety or security concern, but also to emphasize the need for security and vigilance 
in HRP-certified individuals.  Those working with classified weapons information and materials can 
sometimes become complacent about protection procedures.  Questions about arrests, alcohol and 
drug use, family situation, financial condition, as well as psychological testing, not only provide 
valuable information to HRP certification decision makers but also underscore the vital role each 
HRP-certified individual plays in protecting safety and security.  Being subject to the HRP 
recertification process thus underscores the importance of protecting DOE assets and highlights 
many factors that can interfere with that process. 
At a minimum, positions requiring Sigmas 14 and 15 should be included in the DOE HRP.  Sigma 
14 is the category of information concerning the vulnerability of nuclear weapons to deliberate 
unauthorized nuclear detonation.  Sigma 15 is the category of information concerning the design and 
function of nuclear weapons control systems, features, and their components.  This includes use 
control information for passive and active systems.  Both Sigma categories should be designated as 
HRP positions because they include extremely sensitive information that requires the highest level of 
reliability.  Sigma designations 1–13 should also be included in the HRP, however individual Sigma 
evaluations could be conducted to determine the necessity of their inclusion in the HRP. 
Executive protection services 
Agents in the executive protection services, responsible for the safety and security of the Secretary 
of Energy, also at times have access to the President of the United States, foreign dignitaries, heads 
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of state, and the security plans and procedures necessary to ensure the safety of these important 
personnel.   
Members of the protection services have access to information that could be useful to anyone 
planning to harm government executives.  The HRP continuous evaluation process can produce 
information about personal issues or medical conditions that may affect an agent’s ability to respond 
to a situation.  Additionally, individuals who are under stress, abusing drugs and/or alcohol, or 
subject to other conditions or circumstances may not be able to perform their duties in a safe and 
reliable manner. 
The HRP would provide an opportunity to assess the current functioning of executive protection 
services agents.  While in the field, success in performing their duties depends on constant vigilance 
and attention.  Stress, mental conditions such as depression or anxiety, and domestic problems can 
all affect cognitive functioning.  The HRP medical assessment may identify conditions including lack 
of visual acuity; impaired hearing; neuromuscular impairment; cardiovascular, endocrine, 
cerebravascular, or other neurologic diseases; or the use of medications that could affect judgment 
or ability to perform assigned duties in a reliable and safe manner.  The HRP medical assessment 
provides important information regarding an individual’s physical and mental status, which are 
critical elements to those in the executive protection services.  
Although executive protection services personnel are carefully selected and vetted, their 
circumstances may change with time.  The HRP is designed to continuously evaluate individuals in 
positions where unreliable behavior or circumstances could pose a serious threat to safety and 
security.  The HRP recertification process can ensure that the qualities which resulted in initial 
selection are still present, and that the agents remain dedicated to the safety and security of those 
they protect.   Executive protection services personnel should therefore be added to the positions 
requiring HRP certification to ensure that their physical and mental suitability are at the highest 
level.  
Systems administrators 
Insider compromise of physical security measures can be a risk in DOE facilities.  Many physical 
security measures are controlled by computer programs and hardware.  In addition, virtually all 
sensitive information is contained in digital records.  Systems administrators have the potential to 
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divert information and conceal such diversion.  Personnel in those positions know how the software 
and hardware works, and thus they understand its vulnerability.   
Systems administrators can have access to highly classified materials, information about 
vulnerabilities, protection force deployment, SNM movements, and storage of classified data that 
could be valuable to persons wishing to harm the organization or nation.  A skilled administrator 
could bypass the protections and gain access to the information without being detected.  Computer 
security, to a considerable extent, still depends on the dedication of those charged with its 
development and maintenance. 
Managing computer systems requires that individuals comply with the procedures designed to 
protect information from corruption or diversion.  Anything that could affect the willingness to 
comply increases the risk potential.  There are many ways in which the systems could be 
compromised, including the unauthorized transfer of classified information into an unclassified 
system.   Such an activity could be caused by domestic stress, medical bills, or other financial 
demands.  Coercion because of conflicting loyalties, illegal activities, or the abuse of drugs or alcohol 
is also a concern.   
Disgruntled workers may also pose a risk to classified computer systems.  Havoc could be wreaked 
by erasing hard drives, tape or other forms of backup, physically destroying equipment, or 
introducing malicious code.  HRP designation of systems administrator positions means that these 
personnel are evaluated to detect changes in attitude and motivation or identify other reliability 
concerns.   
Including systems administrators in the HRP would expose them to the same continuous 
observation process experienced by other workers who have access to classified information.   
Including systems administrator positions in the HRP would also fulfill a recommendation in the 
Mies1 review of NNSA security to “Require screening of all sensitive e-network administrators as 
part of the Human Reliability Program.” 
Intelligence/counterintelligence 
Individuals involved in intelligence or counterintelligence operations ask the question, “Who is 
watching the watchers?”  Intelligence and counterintelligence personnel have access to highly 
1 Mies, Richard W. et al. NNSA Security: An Independent Review, Sage Systems Technologies, LLC, and LMI, April 2005. 
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sensitive information. Additionally, these personnel may be in direct contact with those involved in 
espionage activities.  The vulnerability of intelligence officers revolves around both the quality of 
their work and their access to sensitive information and materials that may be valuable to other 
nations and groups. 
Like the other proposed additions to the positions designated in the HRP, employees in 
intelligence/counterintelligence positions need to be reliable.  Their jobs require concentration and 
attention to detail, which can be negatively influenced by a variety of mental and physical conditions 
and other circumstances. 
As with any worker, changes in health status of the individual or loved ones, family or other 
domestic problems, even changes in the job can produce stress.  The ability of the individual to 
manage that stress and perform job tasks in a safe and secure manner may be challenged.  That same 
stress can lead to alcohol or drug abuse as a form of self medication. 
Because the principal purpose of the intelligence/counterintelligence program should be a 
comprehensive and proactive approach to protecting DOE materials and information, it is 
imperative that intelligence and counterintelligence personnel be included in the HRP.  A regular 
and systematic assessment can ensure that the workers are focused on their tasks while in 
compliance with rules and procedures.   
Biological and chemical program personnel 
Several DOE facilities have robust programs to detect chemical and biological agents that could be 
released into the environment.  The personnel who work with these detection systems and have 
access to chemical and biological agents are currently not covered by a DOE program but rather are 
covered by facility-administered programs closely patterned after the HRP.∗  These programs 
incorporate almost all facets of the DOE HRP but have no headquarters policy oversight or 
support.  Personnel included in these programs also have no avenue for appealing certification or 
revocation decisions.  These characteristics necessarily limit the effectiveness of the local programs 
and may pose a liability risk, both to individual facilities and the DOE. 
∗ An example is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Select Agent Human Reliability Program implemented in 
March 2005. 
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One critical difference between the local programs and the HRP is that local certification must be 
approved by another government agency initially and at five-year intervals thereafter, whereas the 
HRP has an annual DOE certification requirement.  It is therefore proposed that these local 
programs be eliminated and personnel in positions currently covered under them be assimilated into 
the HRP population.  This would eliminate processing these individuals in separate but very similar 
programs, ensure headquarters oversight, and provide participants with the review and appeal rights 
afforded HRP-certified individuals. 
Protecting the nation from chemical and biological threats should include ensuring the reliability of 
those who design and deploy the detection systems or have access to the biological/chemical agents.  
These individuals represent safety and security concerns that can be considered as significant as 
those posed by HRP-certified personnel who design, protect, and transport weapons systems.  It is 
therefore proposed that individuals who have knowledge of or access to chemical and biological 
agents or detection systems be HRP certified. 
Review of current positions 
A review should be conducted of positions currently requiring HRP certification and some current 
HRP positions excluded from the program.  The most obvious are the Security Police Officer (SPO) 
positions, which are covered by 10 CFR Part 1046, Physical Protection of Security Interests.  This 
regulation thoroughly delineates physical, mental, and training requirements for SPOs and has more 
stringent suitability requirements than the HRP.  The one exception to this is the access 
authorization requirement.  Currently all HRP candidates and HRP-certified individuals must have a 
DOE “Q” access authorization.  Under 10 CFR §1046.14, some SPOs are not required to maintain 
a “Q” level access authorization:  
Security police officer personnel who have access to Category I or II quantities of 
special nuclear material (SNM) will be “Q” cleared.  The specific level of access 
authorization for each duty assignment shall be designated by the site security 
organization and approved by the Head of the Field Element. Security police officers 
shall possess a minimum of an “L” or DOE Secret access authorization. Security 
police officers possessing less than “Q” access authorization shall not be assigned to 
offensive positions or duties where fully automatic firearms are required.  
All SPOs having access to Category I or II SNM still require a “Q” access authorization, which is 
one of the HRP requirements and supports the security interests of DOE. 
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Conclusion  
All positions at DOE facilities should be carefully reviewed and evaluated to assess the relationship 
to not only the insider risk, but also the risk to the overall national security.  It is highly 
recommended that, in addition to those positions listed in 10 CFR §712.10, the rule should be 
modified to include individuals assigned to, or applying for the following positions: 
 Those affording access to information contained in weapons data categories Sigma 14 and 
15; Sigmas 1–13 should also be evaluated for inclusion.  
 Executive protection services agents.  
 Designated systems administrators. 
 Intelligence/counterintelligence personnel. 
 Those with access to, (1) chemical and biological release detection systems, and/or (2) 
chemical and biological agents. 
It would appear that the reliability of SPOs is adequately addressed in another regulation, 10 CFR 
Part 1046, and therefore consideration should be given to removing this group from the HRP.  
Although diverse, individuals in the proposed HRP positions may pose a unique insider risk as well 
as a risk to the safety and security of other personnel, DOE facilities, and the national security.  
Therefore, DOE should evaluate these positions for inclusion in the DOE HRP (10 CFR §712.10).   
